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CIVIL RIGHTS PARADOX? LAWYERS AND
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY
David M. Engstrom*
INTRODUCTION
In the past fifty years, lawyers have become increasingly
involved in attempts to reform American public education. Along
the way, they have achieved an incredible string of victories.
Lawyer-led reform efforts have, among other things, challenged
the constitutionality of segregated schooling, created constitutional and statutory rights to education for disabled, nonEnglish-speaking, and immigrant students, and, in some states,
forced the overhaul of state school finance systems in direct
opposition to the cherished American value of local fiscal
control.
But law-driven reform efforts have also fallen short on at
least some fronts. High segregation levels remain and may have
even risen in recent years.1 Average reading, math, and science
scores for African-American students lag several years behind the
average reading scores of their white counterparts.2 Minority
* J.D. Candidate, Stanford University, Class of 2002. Ph.D. Candidate
in Political Science, Yale University. Law clerk for the Honorable Diane P.
Wood, United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, 2002-03. The
author would like to thank Nora Freeman, Barbara Fried, Tom Grey, Pam
Karlan, Mark Kelman, Josh Klein, and Bill Koski for their helpful criticism.
All errors are mine.
1
See GARY ORFIELD, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 53-55 (1997).
2
For example, in 1995-96, average scores of thirteen year old black
students on the reading, math, and science segments of the National
Assessment of Educational Progress Tests were, respectively, thirty-one,
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students are also more likely than whites to drop out of high
school.3 The proportion of disabled students who fail to earn a
standard high school diploma is roughly six times that of nondisabled students.4 Per-pupil spending disparities between states
are large.5 Interdistrict disparities in per-pupil spending are even
greater.6 Family income remains the most reliable predictor of a
twenty-nine, and forty points lower than their white counterparts. See BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES: 2000 178 tbl. 286 (2000) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT 2000].
3
In 1998, the white drop-out rate was 4.4%, the black drop-out rate was
5.0%, and the Hispanic drop-out rate was 8.4%. The total percentage of
whites, blacks, and Hispanics who had not completed high school and were
not enrolled in 1998 was 13.7%, 17.1%, and 34.4% respectively. See
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2000, supra note 2, at 180 tbl. 290.
4
In 1997-98, 29% of all students with disabilities ages seventeen to
twenty-one and 74% of students with disabilities exiting the educational system
(i.e., graduating, receiving a certificate of completion, reaching the maximum
age for services, or dropping out) received a standard high school diploma. By
comparison, the high school completion rate hovers near 90% for non-disabled
students. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, TO ASSURE THE FREE
APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION OF ALL CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES:
TWENTIETH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT iv-34 (1998) [hereinafter
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, TO ASSURE THE FREE APPROPRIATE
PUBLIC EDUCATION OF ALL CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIES].
5
In 1999, average per-pupil expenditures in New Jersey, one of the
highest spending states, was $10,420. The average in Mississippi, one of the
lowest spending states, was $4,658. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2000, supra note
2, at 172 tbl. 275.
6
A representative example is Ohio, where, during the 1995-96 school
year, per pupil spending ranged from $2,346 to $13,622—a nearly six-fold
difference. See Amy Ellen Schwartz, School Districts and Spending in the
Schools, Consortium for Policy Research in Education, available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs99/1999334/text3.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
Similarly, in 1995, the town of Eden, Vermont spent $2979 per student, while
the town of Winhall, Vermont spent $7726. See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d
384, 389 (Vt. 1997). The Supreme Court of Vermont noted that it was
common for school districts to spend more than twice as much per student as
neighboring districts. Id. Earlier school finance suits in Montana and Texas
challenged even greater inter-district disparities. The Supreme Court of
Montana found a nearly eight to one differential in per-pupil spending when it
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student’s educational attainment and achievement.7
The mixed success of lawyer-led school reform efforts has
provided rich material for thinking about the limits of public law
and the institutional capacity of courts to effect social and
institutional change.8 Law-based reform efforts have also
spawned critiques. Some blame legalization because legal decrees
produce inflexibility and force schools to devote precious
resources to compliance matters, leaving inadequate resources to
provide a sound educational product to needy students.9 Some
critics go further and argue that any additional advancement of
educational equity will require institutional shocks to the system
that no incremental reform program can deliver.10 These critics
struck down that state’s school finance system in 1989. See Helena Elementary
Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Mont. 1989). That same year, perpupil spending in Texas ranged from $2,112 to $19,333. See Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989).
7
See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
8
See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCMANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY
REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); GERALD
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1991).
9
“Legalization” has been described as having three main features: “[A]
focus on the individual as the bearer of rights, the use of legal concepts and
modes of reasoning, and the provision of legal techniques such as written
agreements and court-like procedures to enforce and protect rights.” See
David Neal & David L. Kirp, The Allure of Legalization Reconsidered: The
Case of Special Education, in SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS: THE
LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION OF EDUCATION 343, 344 (David L. Kirp &
Donald N. Jensen eds., 1986). For a critique of legalization, see David L.
Kirp, Introduction: The Fourth R: Reading, Writing, ‘Rithmetic—and Rules, in
SCHOOL DAYS, RULE DAYS: THE LEGALIZATION AND REGULATION OF
EDUCATION 1, 4 (David L. Kirp & Donald N. Jensen eds., 1986)
(summarizing debates about whether rights- and rule-mindedness undermines
professional authority, creates inflexibility, and produces adversarial tension
between parents and teachers); JOEL E. HENNING, MANDATE FOR CHANGE:
THE IMPACT OF LAW ON EDUCATIONAL INNOVATION 231 (1979) (summarizing
survey research and reporting that many respondents “view the law and courts
as failing to provide appropriate support and as frustrating the schools’
educational goals”).
10
See Michael Heise, Choosing Equal Educational Opportunity: School
Reform, Law, and Public Policy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (2001)

ENGSTROMMACRO4-25.DOC

390

7/16/02 2:11 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

typically point to school choice, vouchers, and the application of
market discipline as the surest way to wring additional equity
from the system.11
Jay Heubert and contributors confront these and other issues
in a recent edited volume entitled Law & School Reform: Six
Strategies for Promoting Educational Opportunity.12 The
principal aim of Law & School Reform is to “tell the story of the
growing involvement of lawyers in America’s public schools in
the past half century” and suggest “possible future roles” for
lawyers in “law-driven school reform.”13 The scope of the
volume is impressive, as is the list of contributors.14 The volume
is also the first of its kind to juxtapose the many law-driven
school reforms of the past fifty years. The resulting bird’s eye
view provides an ideal platform for considering the role of law
and lawyers in school reform efforts as a whole.
The volume’s sole failing is that Heubert does not adequately
capitalize on the unique perspective his volume offers. Relying
on the impressive scope of Law & School Reform, this review
(“[A] structural assault on the education status quo is almost assuredly a
necessary condition for the generation of much needed and desired education
reform.”).
11
JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S
SCHOOLS (1990). For a seminal statement, see MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
12
JAY P. HEUBERT, ED., LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR
PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY (Yale Univ. Press 1999).
13
See Harold Howe II, Foreword, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX
STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY vii (Jay. P. Heubert ed.,
1999).
14
A partial list of the contributors includes Martin Gerry, a former
director of the Office for Civil Rights in the U.S. Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, Thomas Hehir, former director of the Office of
Special Education at the U.S. Department of Education, Harold Howe II, a
former U.S. Commissioner of Education in the Johnson Administration and
chair of the Educational Testing Service, Martha Minow, a Harvard Law
School professor, Gary Orfield, a professor of education and social policy at
Harvard University and the leading academic voice on the issue of
desegregation, Carola and Marcelo Suarez-Orozco, both professors of human
development and psychology at Harvard University, and Paul Weckstein, a codirector of the Center for Law and Education in Washington, D.C.
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attempts to fill that analytic gap. I argue that lawyers involved in
efforts to expand educational equity—including academic lawyers
like Heubert—have too often failed to acknowledge both the
contested premises and the unintended consequences of civilrights-based litigation in the area of education. In fact, the
successful civil rights assault on racial segregation and the
categorical exclusion of disabled and other student groups from
public schooling has given way to a world in which resource
allocations, not access, determine educational equity. Reformminded lawyers need to realize that, beyond the dismantlement of
Jim Crow and the opening of schoolhouse gates to excluded
groups, an important legacy of the law-driven reform efforts of
the past half-century has been the exacerbation of what many
increasingly see as a perverse allocation of educational resources
among the many student groups who make claims on scarce
resources. Of particular note is the relative allocation of
resources to students with disabilities as opposed to student
groups who suffer from other forms of disadvantage.
The blind spot for lawyers has been understanding how lawdriven reform efforts fit together and, in particular, how legal
mobilizations in one policy area shape resource allocations
elsewhere in the educational system. This failure is
understandable. Lawyers tend to operate as part of particular
legal mobilizations on behalf of particular groups. Lawyers also
remain bound by professional-ethical obligations that demand
zealous pursuit of localized client interests. A third possible
explanation is that the inclusionary impulse of Brown v. Board of
Education15 is so strong within legal and political culture that it
tends to cloud more policy-analytic thinking about how to
allocate scarce resources within the American system of public
education. Whatever the cause, the law and education field seems
to suffer from a disconnect between lawyers and policy analysis.
This review thus adds a voice to emerging scholarly analysis that
critiques the allocation of resources in the American educational
system and the ways in which civil rights-oriented school reform
efforts have contributed to that state of affairs.
15

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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This review proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview
of the volume and highlights the principal arguments advanced by
Heubert in his introductory essay: that lawyers should develop
more policy-specific knowledge and should in turn deploy that
knowledge in non-adjudicative and collaborative settings. Part II
offers a brief critique of both tenets of Heubert’s prescription.
Part III breaks through the more compartmentalized accounts of
different law-driven school reforms offered in Law & School
Reform and sketches a broader and more dominant story. In
particular, I argue that law-driven school reforms over the past
half-century—particularly those that derive from civil rightsbased mobilizations—highlight an important tension between
bureaucratic and inclusionary reformist impulses. The former
impulse focuses on targeted resource infusions as a way of
maximizing educational outcomes. The latter is a legal-cultural
inclusionary impulse that extends from the integration vision
articulated in Brown. This tension is particularly important in
light of the declining significance of race as a basis for resource
claims, and the parallel expansion of the importance of other
protected characteristics—particularly disability—as a basis for
redistributions. Understanding this tension, I argue, provides the
best lens for understanding the civil rights paradox at the heart of
law-driven school reforms. Part IV asks whether lawyers are to
blame for the current state of affairs and how they might avoid
such problems going forward. In the end, I conclude that lawyers
have little comparative advantage in much of what lies ahead, but
that lawyers might still play a key role by policing a political
process that can sometimes skew redistributions and by helping to
make whatever political choices emerge from that process more
transparent within the system as a whole.
I.

OVERVIEW OF LAW & SCHOOL REFORM

What are “law-driven school reforms”? Law & School
Reform focuses on six: desegregation; school finance reform;
immigrant education; special education; school-linked service
integration; and enforceable rights to quality education. The book
methodically steps through the different approaches, devoting a
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chapter to each. The first four of these are distinct legal reform
movements with well-established advocacy communities and long
histories of mobilization both inside and outside courtrooms. The
latter two are not and fit awkwardly with the rest of the volume.
For example, service integration, as presented by Martin Gerry,16
is an effort to link the provision of social services and other child
supports to public schools. While school-linked service provision
is increasingly pervasive in urban school reform efforts in
particular,17 it is unclear how the approach is in any way “lawdriven.” Similarly, Paul Weckstein’s contribution provides a
useful roadmap of state and federal statutory and constitutional
provisions that together create “enforceable rights to quality
education.”18 But the chapter is little more than a laundry list,
and nowhere is a distinct legal movement or a significant lawyerled reform opportunity discernible. These final two chapters
simply distract attention from the otherwise fascinating
connections that exist among the first four law-driven reform
approaches that form the meat of the book.
Heubert spells out his editorial vision in the opening chapter.
He seeks to “take stock systematically of a key set of law-based
school reform efforts, each aimed at increasing educational
opportunity.”19 Law & School Reform is meant to chart future
reform avenues by offering up a variety of interdisciplinary
perspectives on the origins, current status, and future prospects
of individual reform efforts. Heubert’s principal thesis, however,

16

Martin Gerry, Service Integration and Beyond: Implications for
Lawyers and Their Training, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES
FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 244 (Jay. P. Heubert ed., 1999).
17
For a general discussion of school-linked service initiatives, see
Symposium, School-Linked Services, 2 FUTURE CHILD (1992); JOY G.
DRYFOOS, FULL-SERVICE SCHOOLS: A REVOLUTION IN HEALTH AND SOCIAL
SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES (1994).
18
Paul Weckstein, School Reform and Enforceable Rights to Quality
Education, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 306 (Jay. P. Heubert ed., 1999).
19
Jay P. Heubert, Six Law-Driven School Reforms: Developments,
Lessons, and Prospects, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR
PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 3 (Jay. P. Heubert ed., 1999).
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is built around trend analysis and his sense that reform-minded
lawyers currently face a much more nuanced and complex set of
educational policy questions than their forebears.20 Lawyers
involved in the civil rights movements of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s
deployed morally clear-cut rights claims in the fight against the
segregation of African-Americans and the outright exclusion of
the disabled21 and immigrants22 from public schools. Current
legal struggles, by contrast, center on much subtler and more
contested questions of how to implement and thus give content to
rights previously won. As Heubert writes, the initial focus on
overcoming segregation and categorical exclusion has given way
to a “greater emphasis on serving children more effectively
within schools and on helping students meet high standards for
academic achievement.”23 It is this critical shift in focus—from
ensuring access from without to ensuring quality of instruction
from within—that creates both challenges and opportunities for
reform-minded education lawyers.24
The most illustrative example of the complexities and
challenges of rights implementation is the education of the

20

Id. at 9, 16.
For a thorough account beyond that provided in LAW & SCHOOL
REFORM, see R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING
WELFARE RIGHTS 135-59 (1994).
22
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
23
Heubert, supra note 19, at 3.
24
Another way to think about the contrast between rights creation and
rights implementation is that the former involves adjudication of rights in a
context in which most of the relevant facts are stipulated to, and the court’s
only job is to decide whether they constitute a violation of legal norms. The
latter involves adjudication in a context in which the court must ascertain and
interpret the relevant facts in the first instance. Brown, then, is a paradigmatic
example of rights creation, insofar as the parties stipulated to the existence of
de jure discrimination, and the announced rule did not go beyond announcing
that such a practice violated equal protection. Current litigation efforts, by
contrast, involve rights implementation because courts must ascertain and
interpret a variety of facts that are difficult to get a handle on, because of the
difficulty of measuring outcomes, determining which remedies are
implementable, and penetrating school bureaucracies.
21
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disabled. Hehir and Gamm’s chapter25 on special education
recounts how early victories in federal courts, including PARC v.
Commonwealth26 and Mills v. Board of Education,27 and the
passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
(“EHA”) in 1975—now referred to as the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)—created legally enforceable
rights to a “free and appropriate education” in “the least
restrictive environment.”28 At the school level, the newly-minted
rights sparked nearly three decades of lawyer-supervised design
of Individualized Education Programs (“IEP”)29 and the ongoing
evolution of caselaw defining “appropriate education” and the
extent of accommodation and “mainstreaming” that school

25

Thomas Hehir & Sue Gamm, Special Education: From Legalism to
Collaboration, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING
EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 205 (Jay. P. Heubert ed., 1999).
26
342 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
27
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
28
The passage of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act in
1975 further consolidated the special education provision. 20 U.S.C. §§14001487 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Renamed the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act in 1990, the IDEA is currently the primary source of federal
aid to state and local school systems for programs and services for infants,
toddlers, children, and youth with disabilities. The IDEA creates a statutory
right to a “free appropriate public education” to all children with disabilities.
Id. at § 1412(a)(1). Under the IDEA, states have the primary responsibility for
providing special education programs and services to school-age children with
disabilities.
29
The IDEA requires that special education and related services be
provided on an individualized basis in accordance with the disabled child’s
individualized education plan (“IEP”). 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4). Under the
IDEA, schools must develop an IEP for every disabled student. Id. The plan
includes a written statement of the child’s educational needs and specific goals,
methodologies, and evaluation procedures for meeting them, and must contain
“specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of children with
disabilities.” Id. at § 1414(d)(1)(A). In addition, schools must ensure that due
process protections are in place to ensure compliance on the part of local
education agencies. If there is a dispute between parents and school authorities
about the content of an IEP, then parents can appeal the proposed IEP to an
administrative hearing officer, and if still unsatisfied, to the state or federal
courts. Id. at § 1415(f), (g), (i).

ENGSTROMMACRO4-25.DOC

396

7/16/02 2:11 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

districts are legally obligated to provide to students with
disabilities.30 While early litigants faced the daunting task of
minting new rights, subsequent generations of education lawyers
have worked to ensure the proper implementation of those rights
at the ground level.
One reason that the elaboration of rights in the school equity
context has proven so complex is that rights implementation
requires the institutional engagement of schools. Earlier legal
challenges to segregation and categorical exclusions could be
done at a remove from the daily activities and operation of
schools. Jim Crow policies barring African-American students
from white schools, for example, could be met with the abstract
claim that the Equal Protection Clause forbids categorization
based on race. Indeed, the peculiar power of rights claims flows
in part from the fact that rights exist as abstract trumps that are
removed from complicated institutional contexts.31
But the implementation of rights in the current education
context increasingly requires lawyers to understand and argue by
reference to the professional practices and norms of teachers and
administrators. For example, the contributions by Gary Orfield
and Paul Weckstein both describe litigation arising from claims
that many school districts perpetuate intra-school racial
30

Important Supreme Court decisions include the following: Cedar
Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Garrett F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999) (requiring school
district to provide full-time nursing services to disabled student during school
hours); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) (holding that the IDEA forbids
schools from expelling students for behaviors related to their handicaps);
Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176
(1982) (defining “free appropriate public education”). The remaining caselaw
is too numerous to summarize here. For a comprehensive summary of recent
caselaw on diagnosis and placement, see Perry A. Zirkel, Special Education
Law Update VII, 160 ED. LAW REP. 1 (2002).
31
See RONALD DWORKIN, Rights As Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS
153, 153 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984) (“Rights are best understood as trumps
over some background justification for political decisions that states a goal for
the community as a whole.”); see also Thomas C. Grey, Cover-Blindness, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 65, 67 (2000) (offering an interpretive account of employment
discrimination law that sets up a similar contrast between abstract and more
contextualized rights claims).
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segregation by creating tracks within the curriculum and
separating students into groups based on “purported differences
in student ability.”32 However, to claim that a school district’s
practice of ability grouping has a segregatory effect requires
litigants and the legal system to engage the school as an
institution to root out and assess the extent to which the
challenged practices serve the purported end of ability grouping
and the extent to which they provide cover for racial
discrimination. The same is true with respect to bilingual
education and programs that serve Limited English Proficient
(“LEP”) children. In both cases, making out a successful legal
claim is no longer an abstract proposition about access to public
institutions, but instead requires courts to fuse legal doctrine and
complex analysis of educational and pedagogical practice.
Heubert seems to identify a similar aspect of institutional
engagement when he asserts that the interaction of law and
education has been characterized in recent years by a “significant
convergence of legal standards and educational norms.”33 In
particular, present-day reform efforts are greatly complicated by
the fact that rights and remedies are increasingly defined by
reference to educational practices and student outcomes.34 Molly
McUsic’s contribution on school finance reform provides the
clearest example. Over the past thirty years, legal challenges to
state school financing formulas have arisen in response to the
sometimes enormous inter-district disparities in per-pupil
spending that result from the funding of public education through
local property taxes.35 Early state constitutional challenges to
school finance regimes relied upon state equal protection clauses
and so-called education clauses.36 Dubbed the “equity” approach,
32

Weckstein, supra note 18, at 341; see also Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F.
Supp. 1306, aff’d, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974).
33
Heubert, supra note 19, at 4.
34
Id. at 32.
35
For an up-to-date listing of cases brought, see Molly S. McUsic, The
Law’s Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and Pitfalls of
School Finance Litigation, in LAW & SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR
PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 90 n.8 (Jay. P. Heubert ed., 1999).
36
See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School
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plaintiffs boldly argued that state constitutions required equality
under the law and therefore a leveling of school finance.37
Successive waves of school finance reform have followed an
“adequacy” approach, relying on the same coupling of state equal
protection clauses and education clauses as did earlier “equity”
lawsuits, but arguing instead for a more limited right to a
constitutionally “adequate” education.38 In some successful
lawsuits, state supreme courts have actively engaged in the
process of defining educational “adequacy,” going so far as to
construct a list of basic competencies that must be taught in order
for the system as a whole to pass constitutional muster.39

Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 105 (1995) (“[E]very state, with the
arguable exception of Mississippi, includes in its constitution an ‘education
clause’ that assigns to the state the responsibility for establishment of a public
school system.”); Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School
Finance Litigation, 28 HARV. J. LEGIS. 307, 333-39 (1991) (categorizing state
educational clauses by the rigor of the requirements set forth in each); see also
William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Implications of the Montana,
Kentucky, and Texas Decisions for the Future of Public School Finance
Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 225-32 (1990).
37
See McUsic, supra note 35, at 89; see also Enrich, supra note 36, at
106-08, 125-26.
38
See Enrich, supra note 36; William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard
Questions Posed by Rodriguez: Ending the Separation of School Finance and
Education Policy by Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and Remedy, 24 CONN.
L. REV. 721, 733 (1992).
39
In Rose v. Council for Better Education, the Kentucky Supreme Court
spelled out seven “essential competencies” that a minimally adequate
education would instill in its students, stating the following:
An efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each
and every child with at least the seven following capacities:
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students
to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization
(ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to
enable students to make informed choices
(iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the
student to understand the issues that affect his or her community,
state, and nation
(iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and
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Similarly, in its effort to fashion remedies in the state’s longstanding school finance litigation, the New Jersey Supreme Court
recently sanctioned the wholesale adoption of a specific school
reform package called “Success for All” as a way to meet
obligations under the state constitution.40 These examples
illustrate the fact that legal standards such as “adequacy” acquire
meaning only by reference to educational practices and
professional norms. The inevitable result is greater institutional
engagement of schools by the legal system.
Having exhaustively demonstrated the law’s increasing
institutional engagement of schools and the convergence of legal
standards and educational norms, Heubert sets forth two related
proposals for lawyers seeking to deploy law to advance
educational equity. First, he asserts that lawyers must develop a
greater understanding of the nuts and bolts of education policy if
they wish to contribute to the lawyer-educator collaboration that
he sees as critical to the success of present-day reform efforts.41
Second, Heubert argues that lawyers who wish to contribute to
school reform must develop non-adjudicative skills and learn to
“function effectively in the larger political process, as legislators,
regulators, mediators, and consensus builders.”42 By developing
more policy-specific knowledge and deploying that knowledge in
non-adjudicative and collaborative settings, Heubert believes that
physical wellness
(v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage
(vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and
pursue life work intelligently; and
(vii) sufficient level of academic or vocational skills to enable public
school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.
Rose v. Council for a Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
40
See Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450, 457 (N.J. 1998). For a description
of Success for All, see the program’s website at http://www.successforall
.com/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
41
Heubert, supra note 19, at 6-7.
42
Id. at 5.
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lawyers can continue to make inroads against persistent
educational inequities.
II. A CRITIQUE
Heubert’s claim that lawyers can better represent clients in
education-related litigation with a stronger substantive policy
background has superficial appeal. After all, who could argue
with greater policy learning on the part of lawyers bringing
education-related claims? To the extent that Law & School
Reform facilitates broader understanding of how law and policy
interact, the book will likely advance equality of educational
opportunity at the margins. But Heubert’s call for greater policy
learning, lawyer-educator collaboration, and non-adjudicative
reform approaches as a means of dramatically advancing
educational equity is naively optimistic. Many of the contributors
to Law & School Reform tend to overstate the reach of law in
past education reform efforts, fail to specify the advantages of
non-adjudicative approaches to reform, gloss over contentious
empirical debates among educational policy experts about the
effectiveness of particular policies, and overstate consensus on
important values issues. Many of these weaknesses result from a
failure to see that educational policy debates are beset by
empirical indeterminacy and deep values conflicts. As a
consequence, the move to non-adjudication and collaboration
risks consigning lawyers to the dismal role of debate mediator.
Indeed, reading Law & School Reform, one wonders whether
lawyers, law, and legal institutions can retain any comparative
advantage at all over other policy actors in future reform efforts.
A. Non-Adjudication and Comparative Disadvantage
Non-adjudicative approaches to social and institutional reform
have come into fashion in the last two decades, piggybacking on
broader shifts in the law away from legal adversarialism and
toward alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”).43 The
43
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attractiveness of such non-adjudicative approaches has been
enhanced by the perceived shortcomings and social costs of more
litigation-focused approaches to institutional and social reform.44
The move to non-adjudicative approaches has also been
occasioned by a sustained assault on “judicial activism” and
concern about an “imperial judiciary” in response to growing
judicial involvement in the reform of public institutions.45 Public
law litigation, critics have zealously argued, violates core
principles of separation of powers and produces perverse policy
results because courts lack the institutional capacity to carry out
broad remedial tasks.46 Nevertheless, beginning in 1954 with the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education,47
federal courts have become increasingly involved in remedial
oversight of basic functions of state and local governments.
Judicial remedial involvement accelerated throughout the 1960s
PROGRESS IN EVOLUTION 36-37 (1984); see also LINDA R. SINGER, SETTLING
DISPUTES 1-14 (1994) (detailing the origins and growth of the ADR
approach).
44
See generally THOMAS F. BURKE, LITIGATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
THE STRUGGLE OVER LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (forthcoming 2002) (detailing anti-litigation reforms adopted in the
United States since the late 1960s); see also ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at 336.
45
Nathan Glazer, Toward an Imperial Judiciary, 41 PUB. INTEREST 104,
104 (1975).
46
See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 18
(1977) (arguing that the relevant question in the expansion of judicial oversight
of public policy matters is not “whether courts should perform certain tasks
but . . . whether they can perform them competently”); JEREMY RABKIN,
JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: HOW PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY 20
(1989) (“Courts are entirely unequipped to act as ongoing, freestanding
guardians of administrative performance.”). But see Ralph Cavanaugh &
Austin Sarat, Thinking About Courts: Toward and Beyond a Jurisprudence of
Judicial Competence, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 371, 373 (1980) (arguing that
critiques based on institutional competency “underestimate the demonstrated
ability of courts to evolve new mechanisms and procedures in response to
implicit or explicit societal demands”); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge
in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976) (rebutting
critics of the public law model and arguing that public law litigation is both
workable and inevitable in an increasingly regulated society).
47
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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and 70s as a wide range of judicial decrees implemented reforms
in public institutions beyond schools, including jails,48 prisons,49
mental health facilities,50 and housing projects.51
Most contemporary calls for non-adjudicative reform
approaches aim, at least in part, to respond to the foregoing
criticisms. But as a definitional matter, it is not at all clear that
the new approaches advocated by Heubert and the contributors to
Law & School Reform are really non-adjudicative in any strong
sense.52 Indeed, most of the non-adjudicative approaches cited by
proponents involve consent decrees and judge-imposed “dialogic
remedies.” They are clearly “quasi-adjudicative.” And even
purely non-adjudicative negotiations involving lawyers and

48

See, e.g., Taylor v. Perini, 413 F. Supp. 189 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff’d in
relevant part sub nom, Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977);
Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d and remanded,
507 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1974), on remand, 389 F. Supp. 964, amended, 396 F.
Supp. 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975), Rhem v.
Malcolm, 432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp.
825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff’d, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
50
See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
344 F. Supp 373 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff’d in part, Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); New York Ass’n of Retarded Children v.
Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
51
See, e.g., Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
52
Similar definitional matters have occupied other commentators as well.
Compare Charles Berger, Equity Without Adjudication: Kansas School
Finance Reform and the 1992 School District Finance and Quality
Performance Act, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (1998) (arguing that use of a nonadjudicative reform model was critical to the success of school finance reform
in Kansas) with Perry A. Zirkel, Non-Adjudicative? You Be the Judge, 28 J.L.
& EDUC. 231, 233 (1999) (questioning Berger’s characterization of the Kansas
reform process as “non-adjudicative,” because the “Mock” opinion that
spurred the process was “preceded and proceeded” by state supreme court
opinions); Ralph Puerta, A Pennsylvania Perspective on Charles Berger’s
“Equity Without Adjudication,” 28 J.L. & EDUC. 235, 236 (1999) (comparing
school finance reform efforts in Kansas and school finance litigation in
Pennsylvania and questioning whether the former approach was truly “nonadjudicative”).
49
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educators but no actual judicial intervention are conducted in the
“shadow of the law” with the threat of litigation hanging over the
proceedings throughout.53
Most significantly, Law & School Reform provides no real
explanation why quasi-adjudicative approaches to school reform
will necessarily yield better results than past litigation efforts.
Establishing the mixed success of past litigation efforts is easy
enough. Indeed, there is substantial evidence that litigants
involved in reform efforts may have overestimated the reach of
courts in the public educational system. For example,
desegregation litigation has had only mixed success, given
continuing high levels of segregation. Similarly, even though
substantial time and energy have been devoted to school finance
litigation efforts over the past thirty years, the empirical evidence
in states where school finance challenges prevailed suggests that
courts’ ability to influence education spending is mixed.54 In
states like Connecticut, Texas, and New Jersey, the typical result
has been serial litigation with extensive judicial-political dialogue
but insignificant narrowing of spending inequities between school
districts.55 The principal reason for the mixed success of school
finance reform efforts is political: the allocation of dollars to
school districts is dictated by complicated funding formulas that
53

Robert Mnoonkin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
54
Compare McUsic, supra note 35, at 105 (“[M]ost data indicate that the
school finance regimes adopted under court order have generally led to more
equitable funding.”), William N. Evans, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and
Statehouses After Serrano, 16 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 10, 28 (1997)
(same), and Alan Hickrod, The Effect of Constitutional Litigation on
Education Finance, 18 J. EDUC. FIN. 180, 207-208 (1992) (same) with
Michael Heise, State Constitutional Litigation, Educational Finance, and
Legal Impact: An Empirical Analysis, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1735, 1763 (1995)
(“When the results are considered together, the picture that emerges does not
support the general assumption that state supreme court decisions involving
equity lawsuits that invalidate school finance systems result in increased
educational spending.”).
55
See Mark Jaffe & Kenneth Kersch, Guaranteeing a State Right to a
Quality Education: The Judicial-Political Dialogue in New Jersey, 20 J.L. &
EDUC. 271, 297 (1991).
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are periodically revised and precisely mirror the political balance
of power in a given state. Governors and legislatures resent the
reformers’ efforts to use courts to circumvent the elected
branches and to force their hand on basic resource allocation
issues. By contrast, in states like Kentucky, where significant
mobilization took place prior to the state supreme court’s
decision, the legislature responded to the court’s decree with a
near-total overhaul of the state’s educational system.56 Lacking
the sword and purse, and dependent on other branches for
implementation, courts engaged in school reform efforts have had
substantial difficulty implementing decrees without an
accompanying political mobilization.
The problem is that non- and quasi-adjudicative reform
efforts have probably not fared any better than more traditional
litigation efforts in meeting reformers’ goals. Reform efforts
have yielded mixed results when courts have combined litigation
with non-adjudicative approaches at the remedial stage. The
recent utilization of a so-called “dialogic remedy” failed to make
much headway in the remedial process following the Connecticut
Supreme Court’s decision in Sheff v. O’Neill.57 In that case,
having declared unconstitutional the “de facto racial and ethnic
segregation”58 of students in Hartford public schools, the court
deferred to the legislative and executive branches to “put the
search for appropriate remedial measures at the top of their
respective agendas.”59 The resulting statewide public engagement
process sputtered and died, with no significant change in the
delivery or finance of public education in Connecticut’s racially

56

See Enrich, supra note 36, at 175-77; see also John Dayton, The
Judicial-Political Dialogue: A Comment on Jaffe and Kersch’s “Guaranteeing
a State Right to a Quality Education,” 22 J.L. & EDUC. 323, 325 (1993)
(arguing that judicial decrees without popular support cannot produce
meaningful education reform).
57
678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
58
Id. at 1271.
59
Id. at 1290. For analysis of the Connecticut Supreme Court’s Sheff
decision, see James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance
Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 529 (1999).
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isolated inner-city schools.60 Similarly, the court presiding over
school finance reform in Alabama appointed a facilitator to work
with the parties on a proposed remedial order and at least initially
managed to cobble together an “impressive consensus” on reform
directions.61 However, consensus quickly unraveled and the
shape of reforms quickly became a partisan and hotly-contested
issue. Substantial litigation has ensued.62
As a final point, Heubert and the other contributors fail to
address the possibility that the checkered success of past reform
efforts stems from the fact that public schools are particularly
complex bureaucracies, rather than from the inherent limitations
of public law litigation as a reform vehicle. The standard critique
of public law litigation is that courts are peculiarly unsuited to the
task of institutional reform.63 But it may also be the case that
schools are much more resistant to reform efforts than other
public institutions. For example, organizational theorists see
schools as “loosely coupled” bureaucratic forms that lack the
clear lines of authority and accountability that ensure productivity
in other bureaucratic environments.64 Much of what goes on in

60

See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy and Engagement:
The Remedies Problem Posed by Sheff v. O’Neill—And a Proposed Solution,
29 CONN. L. REV. 1115, 1143-1158 (1997) (proposing a “dialogic approach”
as a remedial option in the Sheff litigation). For an account of the failure of the
process to effect any significant reform, see Kathryn A. McDermott,
Regionalism Forestalled: Metropolitan Fragmentation and Desegregation
Planning in Greater New Haven, Connecticut, in CHANGING URBAN
EDUCATION 45 (Clarence Stone ed., 1998).
61
See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities,
and the Courts: A Dialogic Approach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 99, 161 & nn. 248-52 (1996).
62
Id.; see also, Martha I. Morgan et al., Establishing Education Program
Inadequacy: The Alabama Example, 28 MICH. J.L. REF. 559, 562-63 n.15
(1995) (describing the post-trial litigation).
63
See supra note 46.
64
See Karl E. Weick, Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled
Systems, 21 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1, 1 (1976); see also JAMES Q. WILSON,
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT
158-71 (1989) (arguing that, as public bureaucracies, schools are particularly
vulnerable to goal, output, and outcome uncertainty).
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schools takes place behind closed doors by teachers who enjoy
significant discretion over day-to-day activities.65 In addition, as
“open systems,” schools must mediate and overcome clashes
between a wide range of stakeholders, including state and local
professionals, teachers and their unions, elected officials, school
boards, administrators, parents and their associations, students,
community activists, the media, business leaders, and
foundations.66 The resulting lack of accountability and pursuit of
proximate goals by interested parties makes change difficult. This
is true whether the change at issue involves implementation of a
consent decree or attempts to alter particular teacher practices in
the classroom.
In the end, any effort to effect substantive and lasting reform
is difficult because it is notoriously difficult to dislodge schools’
“accustomed practice and organization.”67 And this is probably
true whether would-be reformers employ adjudicative or quasiadjudicative means. Thus, the assumptions and analysis that
undergird Heubert’s call for more non-adjudicative and
collaborative activity clearly need further examination and
support.
B. Policy Learning and a Dismal Role for Lawyers
Equally problematic is the second component of Heubert’s
call for a “new legalization” of school reform efforts—greater

65

See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF
13-18 (1980).
66
See Marilyn Gittell, School Reform in New York and Chicago:
Revisiting the Ecology of Local Games, 30 URB. AFF. Q. 136, 138 (describing
the role of various interest groups and stakeholders in education
decentralization experiments in Chicago in the late 1980s and New York City
in the late 1960s); see also Marion Orr, The Challenge of School Reform in
Baltimore: Race, Jobs, and Politics, in CHANGING URBAN EDUCATION 93
(Clarence Stone ed., 1998) (arguing that urban schools are patronage machines
and thus subject to rent-seeking by interest groups, especially teacher unions).
67
SEYMOUR SARASON, THE PREDICTABLE FAILURE OF EDUCATIONAL
REFORM 70 (1990).
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policy learning on the part of lawyers.68 The reality is that most
lawyers are perfectly capable of understanding core debates
within education policy circles. Most can intelligently read the
semi-technical academic literature that characterizes such
debates, or at least the voluminous law review literature that
summarizes various positions within such debates.69 On this
point, Heubert’s claims that few education lawyers “know the
fields of education and educational administration”70 and that
“few know how to read and understand educational research”71
are unconvincing. Instead, an equally plausible argument can be
made that any additional policy learning will merely reveal that
most areas of educational policy and practice are beset by
empirical indeterminacy and deep value-based contentions.72
Given the depth of disagreement on a range of empirical and
values-based questions, lawyers and legal institutions appear to
be left with a dismal role—mediating value clashes and
interpreting statutory language against the backdrop of expert
disagreement on efficacy.
The extent of the impasse is not made clear in Law & School
Reform, particularly since several of the contributors, true to the
lawyerly cast of the book, adopt a brief-like tone and gloss over
major areas of contention. For example, Gary Orfield cites social
scientific research that purports to demonstrate the educational
gains that flow from racial integration.73 He neglects to cite
68

Heubert, supra note 19, at 6-7.
Michael Rebell, a lawyer himself, has written a number of law review
articles that capably and clearly summarize highly technical debates in
education policy circles. See Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Special
Educational Inclusion and the Courts: A Proposal for a New Remedial
Approach, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 523 (1996).
70
Heubert, supra note 19, at 6 (citing A. Trotter, Flagrante Dilecto, AM.
SCH. BOARD J., Dec. 1990, at 12-18).
71
Heubert, supra note 19, at 6.
72
Heubert seems to acknowledge this fact when he states that
“establishing illegal discrimination will be more difficult when there is
disagreement among educators and researchers about the value or necessity of
the educational policy or practice in question.” Id. at 17. But he fails to
develop the point.
73
ORFIELD, supra note 1, at 41.
69
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equally persuasive studies that demonstrate that the educational
gains that accompany racial integration efforts are in fact quite
small in the grand scheme of things and even difficult to prove
empirically.74 Martin Gerry’s chapter on “service integration”
reads like a brief in support of a community-centered and social
service-oriented approach to public school reform that has
increasingly drawn criticism from education scholars and
practitioners alike.75 Even the fundamental goal of school finance
reform—the narrowing of inter-district disparities in per-pupil
spending—has been criticized by a line of scholarship that calls
into question whether school spending has any appreciable effect
on student outcomes.76 Similar empirical contentions characterize
ongoing debates over special and bilingual education, particularly
the question of the relative amount of time students should spend

74

See DAVID ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND
LAW 59-116 (1995) (summarizing research on the harms of segregation
and the benefits of integration, citing the inconsistent results obtained by social
scientific studies, and questioning the effect of desegregation on academic
achievement in particular).
75
See AMERICAN INST. FOR RESEARCH, AN EDUCATOR’S GUIDE TO
SCHOOLWIDE REFORM 4, app. C (1999) (concluding that only three of twentyfour whole-school reform programs considered can muster convincing proof
of positive effects on student achievement); PAUL T. HILL & MARY BETH
CELIO, FIXING URBAN SCHOOLS 13-17, 28-30 (1998) (arguing that many
reform programs are premised on under-specified causal theories of how
program components will increase student learning); David M. Engstrom,
Note, Post-Brown Politics, Whole-School Reform, and the Case of Norfolk,
Virginia, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 163, 164 (2001) (“[C]urrent urban
school-reform efforts have suffered from a steady proliferation of reform
packages that lack a convincing link to improved academic achievement.”).
76
Dubbed the “cost-quality debate,” economists have churned out a
number of rigorous empirical studies finding that school spending has little to
no explanatory power with respect to student outcomes. These studies utilize a
“production function” approach and regression analysis and conclude that
there is no systematic relationship between educational inputs and outputs.
See, e.g., ERIC A. HANUSHEK & CHARLES S. BENSON, MAKING SCHOOLS
WORK: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AND CONTROLLING COSTS 25-49 (1994);
Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance “Reform” May Not Be Good Policy,
29 HARV. J. LEGIS. 423 (1991).
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in separate versus mainstream classrooms.77
Disagreement on values questions is equally prevalent. For
instance, bilingual education policies raise deep questions about
citizenship, assimilation, and cultural difference in a democratic
society.78 Similarly, the political right’s embrace of colorblindness as an organizing principle—and its resulting opposition
to affirmative action—is based at least in part on a judgment that
color-blindness will better serve the interests of white and
77

In the disability area, for example, experts disagree on a host of
important variables, particularly the relative efficacy of mainstream as against
special instruction. Special education experts cast the debate in terms of
“inclusion” versus “placement diversity.” See Rebell, supra note 69, at 537.
Advocates of the inclusionist perspective argue that teachers often lack a sound
pedagogic basis for referral of particular students to special education, that
special education programs are overly narrow and have little impact on student
achievement, and that special placement has a stigmatizing effect that counters
whatever small educational gains that eventuate. Proponents of placement
diversity, by contrast, maintain that separation based on needs and special
interventions—including individualized instruction, smaller classes, and highly
trained teachers—produce important educational benefits. See Douglas
Marston, The Effectiveness of Special Education: A Time Series Analysis of
Reading Performance in Regular and Special Education Settings, 21 J.
SPECIAL EDUC. 13, 13 (1987-88); Conrad Carlberg & Kenneth Kavale, The
Efficacy of Special Versus Regular Class Placement for Exceptional Children:
A Meta-Analysis, 14 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 295, 304 (1980). They also minimize
the concern with stigma, arguing that labeling is only damaging when it comes
about through inappropriate interventions. See Judith D. Singer, Should
Special Education Merge with Regular Education?, 2 EDUC. POL’Y 409, 412
(1988). For a nice overview, see David L. Kirp et al., Legal Reform of
Special Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural Proposals, 62 CAL. L.
REV. 40 (1974). Participants in bilingual education policy debates make many
of the same moves. See Sonja Diaz-Granados, Note, How Can We Take Away
a Right We Have Never Protected, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 827, 831 (1995)
(comparing the “maintenance approach,” which emphasizes “a continuation of
content area education within the bilingual program,” and a “transitional
approach,” which “concentrates on quickly mainstreaming LEP students); see
also ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW 92 (1986).
78
See John Rhee, Theories of Citizenship and Their Role in the Bilingual
Education Debate, 33 COL. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 33 (1999). For broader
discussion by political theorists, see WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1996); CHARLES
TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM (1996).
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minority citizens alike over the long-term.79 Deep value clashes
are also apparent in a variety of education policy areas not
addressed by Law & School Reform. A good example is the
implementation of “percent plans” in Texas, California, and
Florida. High school students who graduate in, respectively, the
top 10%, 4%, or 20% of their high school classes receive
guaranteed admission—and in some cases, scholarship money—to
any of the state’s flagship public universities.80 Proponents argue
that such plans are a facially neutral means of increasing diversity
in public higher education without using race-conscious
admissions policies.81 Others argue that percent plans are a copout, given that successful fulfillment of one of the plans’
principal goals of increasing diversity depends on continuing
racial segregation at the secondary school level.82 Percent plans
might also be open to criticism on the grounds that the plans send
ill-prepared students to the state’s top schools, forcing those
universities into the business of remedial education.83
79

See, e.g., TERRY EASTLAND, ENDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE
CASE FOR COLORBLIND JUSTICE (1996). Thus, affirmative action debates are
in part just disagreement over empirical outcomes rather than values. One can
imagine opponents in the debate arriving at the same vision of what a good
society would look like in twenty years, but disagreeing as to whether
affirmative action will get us there more efficaciously than color-blindness.
80
See R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Race Outcomes:
Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1029, 1031 n.4
(2001). For a detailed description of the Texas plan, see Danielle Holly &
Delia Spencer, Note, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 245, 245 (1998).
81
See Banks, supra note 80, at 1033-34. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has also expressed implicit support for
“percent plans.” Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234,
1259 (11th Cir. 2001) (describing percent plans as one of several “innovative
strategies” for increasing university diversity).
82
See Jeffrey Selingo, What States Aren’t Saying About the “X-Percent
Solution,” CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 2, 2000, at A31 (citing critics of
percent plans who argue that use of high schools with large minority
populations “exploits educational segregation while doing nothing to make
schools better” and “discourage[s] states from integrating high schools”).
83
Id. (reporting that even proponents of percent plans acknowledge that
many students will not be ready for college and will be directed into summer
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In addition to the specific program areas referenced in Law &
School Reform, present-day education debates suffer from
deeper—and perhaps even more intractable—empirical and
values-based contention about what constitutes “equity” in the
first place. As a society, we might wish to advance equity by
remedying past resource deprivations, by weighing the relative
prospective benefits of spending more on some students than
others, or by creating greater equality of educational outcomes.84
But any effort to “equalize” immediately runs into specification
problems. Application of a strict equality principle might require
the leveling of educational inputs—in other words, spending the
same amount of dollars per pupil. Like the “equity” approach in
school finance litigation, this is probably only aspirational given
political realities. Alternatively, educational equity might be
measured in terms of providing a minimal floor of educational
services to each student, perhaps calculated to obtain a set of
valued outcomes, as in the “adequacy” approach adopted by
school finance litigants.85 This seems more reliable, but the
adequacy approach to school finance finesses the relationship
between inputs and outputs and assumes that a given quantum of
education will ensure a given level of achievement and will thus
be equally valuable to all students.86
The problem is particularly pronounced in the educational
context because social scientists know surprisingly little about the
relationship between educational inputs and outputs or the extent
remedial classes).
84
MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES 9
(1997).
85
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
86
Inputs include teachers, curriculum, and other learning tools—in short,
the stuff of the educational process. Outputs range from short-term
achievement measures to long-term measures of vocational success and
general life chances. As an aside, a number of political theorists have grappled
with the relationship of inputs to outputs—particularly the fact that some
individuals may be able to derive more of a given output from a fixed quantity
of input—and have thus tried to look at equity of goods and services in terms
of what “functionings” that a given good like education will facilitate. See
AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED xi (1995).
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to which academic achievement drives broader life chances. The
most robust social scientific finding of the past four decades is an
enduring and high correlation between academic achievement and
family socio-economic status.87 A “familiar corollary” of this
finding, as McUsic points out, is that “income and education of
parents of fellow students is also highly correlated with
performance.”88 The conclusion drawn by most experts is that
income and education together create “social capital” or “cultural
capital,” which can significantly improve overall educational
outcomes.89 Second, the amount of resources available to schools
matters, but perhaps not as much as one would expect. For
instance, social scientists continue to squabble over the extent to
which “money matters” in fostering high educational
achievement. Although many economists argue that per-pupil
spending has little to no effect on academic achievement,90 other
studies have found that school inputs such as teacher salaries
exert at least some influence on academic achievement.91 Equally
87

The most recent comprehensive treatment of the issue is SUSAN E.
MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND CHILDREN’S LIFE
CHANCES (1997). Classic treatments include JAMES S. COLEMAN, EQUALITY
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966) and CHRISTOPHER JENCKS,
INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCHOOLING IN
AMERICA (1972).
88
One reason might be that relatively wealthier parents serve as
“education connoisseurs” who agitate for quality; another commonly cited
theory of causation is that poor children in relatively wealthier schools are
confronted with role models of academic success. See McUsic, supra note 35,
at 129; James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 301
(1991).
89
See COLEMAN, supra note 87. Coleman coined the term “social
capital”—sometimes referred to alternately as “cultural capital”—in an attempt
to label the mysterious relationship between social privilege and educational
attainment and achievement.
90
See HANUSHEK, supra note 76.
91
The teacher salary finding is particularly important because it suggests
that expenditures may be driving outcomes, assuming that relatively wealthier
schools have greater resources to identify and attract the most highly skilled
teachers from the available teacher pool in a given area. Thus, it may not be
absolute expenditures, but rather relative expenditures within a teacher labor
pool that matters most, a fact that would foil most economistic regressions of
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mixed results obtain in studies of early childhood education
programs, even those that involve sustained commitment of
enormous resources.92 Similarly, and as mentioned previously,
there is little consensus on the efficacy of special education and
bilingual instruction or the impact of desegregation on the
academic achievement of African-Americans.93 The upshot is that
it is probably indeterminate which groups stand to benefit and by
how much under different resource configurations.
In the concluding contribution to Law & School Reform,
Weckstein optimistically claims that we currently have the
necessary knowledge to effect substantial educational equity.94
But the reality is that educational outcomes depend on a
staggeringly complex web of variables and value judgments that,
despite the best efforts of education experts to find consensus,
remain deeply contested. One could try to dress up Heubert’s call
for greater lawyer-led mediation of expert disputes with Rawlsian
rhetoric and to portray lawyers as heroically overseeing the
realization of “overlapping consensus.”95 But it is also
questionable whether lawyers have any comparative advantage in
such an enterprise. In short, a better-read education bar is not
likely to break through the empirical and values impasse in
education policy circles, even if lawyer-mediated reform efforts
can help force choices between, say, relatively more or less
mainstreaming of special education and bilingual students.

the sort conducted by Hanushek. See Ronald Ferguson, Paying for Public
Education: New Evidence on How and Why Money Matters, 28 HARV. J. LEG.
465 (1991); Martha L. Minow, School Finance: Does Money Matter?, 28
HARV. J. LEG. 395 (1991).
92
While programs such as Head Start have been criticized for their
failure to demonstrate long-term effects, a number of other, more intensive
early childhood programs have shown at least some medium- and long-term
effects on academic achievement and life chances. See W. Steven Barnett,
Long-Term Effects of Early Childhood Programs on Cognitive and School
Outcomes, 5 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 25, 32-33, 38-39 (1995).
93
See supra notes 74, 77 and accompanying text.
94
Weckstein, supra note 18, at 307.
95
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1993).
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III. THE LARGER PICTURE
If there is reason to be skeptical about the value of the
prescriptive proposals advanced in Law & School Reform, the
book nonetheless does a great service in describing the current
policy landscape. Criticisms aside, the essays in Law & School
Reform together begin to sketch a larger and more dominant story
that goes beyond Heubert’s narrow prescriptions for advancing
educational equity reform. For instance, a crucial trend in law
and education evident in the various contributions to the book is
the declining significance of race-based resource claims. In
addition, Molly McUsic’s insightful overview of school finance
issues shows that lawyers have presided over the evolution of a
system of federal mandates on behalf of disabled and limited
English proficient students that exacerbates resource disparities
for poor and minority students within the multi-tiered system of
school finance that prevails in the United States.96 The overall
trend might be described as a comparative strengthening of the
resource claims of the disabled and a comparative weakening of
claims based on race and class. While this trend is unfortunate
from the perspective of minority and poor students, it also
demonstrates two very different impulses in tension in law-driven
school reform efforts. One is a bureaucratic impulse that focuses
on targeted resource allocations as a way of improving
educational outcomes. The other is a legal-cultural inclusionary
impulse that extends from the peculiar power of the integration
ideal as articulated in Brown v. Board of Education.97
Understanding this tension is an important first step in
understanding the larger picture of law-driven school reform’s
effect on educational equity over the past fifty years.
A. The Declining Significance of Race-Based Resource
Claims
Brown v. Board of Education sits at the very top of the canon
96
97

McUsic, supra note 35, at 92-93.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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of American legal thought.98 But nowhere else in American law is
the continuing rhetorical power of a court decision matched by so
little remaining power as a reform tool. Indeed, an important part
of the larger backdrop against which law-driven reform efforts
have evolved over the second half of the twentieth century is the
declining significance of race as a basis for resource claims.
Evidence of the decline comes from a number of different
quarters, but most explicitly in the demise of desegregation and
affirmative action at the hands of an increasingly skeptical federal
judiciary. Law & School Reform opens with the issue of
desegregation. But Gary Orfield’s lengthy chapter focuses on the
resegregation of American schools and the increasingly deaf ear
of the federal judiciary to desegregation claims.99 In general,
court-ordered desegregation plans that regulate student
assignments are on the wane.100 Even the African-American
community is increasingly agnostic about the value of continued
desegregation efforts.101 The outlook is equally bleak on the
98

J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law,
111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 974 n.43 (1998).
99
See generally ORFIELD, supra note 1. For relevant Supreme Court
caselaw, see Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467 (1992); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
100
In the last ten years, for example, courts have closed school
desegregation cases in Buffalo, Denver, Savannah, Oklahoma City,
Wilmington, and Charlotte-Mecklenburg and have constructed “exit plans” for
Dallas, Kansas City, and Little Rock. See Wendy Parker, The Future of
School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 1157-58 (2000). Note,
however, that Parker argues that widespread claims that desegregation efforts
are dead are overstated. Id.
101
Recent public opinion surveys have shown that an overwhelming
majority of African-American parents believe that “the higher priority of the
nation’s schools should be to raise academic standards rather than focus on
achieving more diversity and integration.” See PUB. AGENDA, TIME TO MOVE
ON: AFRICAN-AMERICAN AND WHITE PARENTS SET AN AGENDA FOR PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 31 (1998) (reporting results of a survey conducted by Public Agenda
and the Public Education Network); see also, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v.
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518, 528 (1980) (suggesting that the interest of blacks in quality
education might be better served by “focusing on ‘educational components’”
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affirmative action front. As an example, in what may prove to be
the final triumph of the color-blindness principle in equal
protection jurisprudence in education, the University of Michigan
is currently fighting a rear-guard action in its effort to retain an
admissions program that relies on weak racial preferences.102
Another marker of the shift away from race-based claims is
that much of the important doctrinal innovation over the past two
decades has been confined to non-race-based policies. For
instance, while the Supreme Court foreclosed school finance
reform efforts in the federal courts in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,103 the constitutionality of school
finance regimes has produced interesting doctrinal developments
at the state level and has served as a leading example of an
expanded state court role in constitutional adjudication—dubbed
the “new judicial federalism.”104 At the same time, the federal
rather than continued efforts at integration).
102
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2000). Both cases are
currently before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fifth Circuit has
already held that similar affirmative action admissions programs at the
University of Texas are unconstitutional. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932
(1996); see also Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234
(11th Cir. 2001) (calling the question of diversity-goals “an open question,”
and striking down the affirmative action program on tailoring grounds). The
Ninth Circuit has determined, however, that diversity is a compelling enough
state interest for affirmative action at the University of Washington to pass
muster. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir.
2000) (upholding affirmative action and finding diversity to be a compelling
state interest). The Supreme Court is likely to grant certiorari in the Michigan
case and will determine whether Powell’s plurality opinion in Regents of the
Univ. of Cal v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978), is still good law.
103
411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that equal educational funding is not a
fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
104
For discussion of the “equity” and “adequacy” approaches to school
finance litigation, see supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. For general
discussion of the “new judicial federalism,” see Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five
Years After Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation and the Impact of the New
Judicial Federalism, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 175, 176 (1998). For an early
articulation, see William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States:
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courts have decided a neverending string of cases that define the
boundaries of accommodations required under the IDEA and The
Bilingual Education Act.105
By contrast, race has seen little state-level doctrinal
innovation with the possible exception of an isolated effort to
combine school finance and race issues in Sheff v. O’Neill.106
Moreover, the limited doctrinal development relating to race has
actually worked to narrow available race-based legal claims.
During the most recent term, the Supreme Court handed down
Alexander v. Sandoval,107 settling a long-standing question of
whether litigants can bring claims under a disparate impact
standard in Title VI implementing regulations.108 The Court
answered no and, in one fell swoop, eliminated the legal tool
most used by education lawyers to challenge discriminatory
practices in a variety of policy areas, including bilingual
education,109 intra-district racial segregation,110 and the critical
The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548-49 (1986).
105
For review of IDEA caselaw, see supra note 30. The principal
Supreme Court case regarding bilingual education is Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563 (1974). For a review of federal caselaw since Lau, see Ronald D.
Wenkart, Native Language Instruction and the Special Education Student:
Who Decides the Instructional Methodology?, 125 ED. L. REP. 581, 587-90
(1998).
106
678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
107
532 U.S. 1049 (2001).
108
Id. In Sandoval, the Court held that § 602 of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act does not authorize a private right of action under a disparate-impact
standard as provided by implementing regulations, forcing litigants to bring
suit under § 601 under the more restrictive intentional discrimination standard.
Of course, and as Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, the Court’s holding is
“something of a sport” for the moment, id. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting), so
long as plaintiffs are able to bring such claims under § 1983. However, the
Court recently granted certiorari on a case that squarely raises the question.
See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 122 S. Ct. 865 (2002).
109
Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (holding that Title VI
proscription of discrimination by federal funding recipients obligated school
district to provide bilingual educational services to non-English-speaking
students).
110
See ORFIELD, supra note 1.
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new area of racial impact in standardized testing.111 The result is
that education lawyers currently face a steadily shrinking toolkit
from which they can draw in bringing equal protection and other
race-based anti-discrimination claims.
The federal courts have clearly done the most to scale back
the reach of Brown, but the trend away from race-conscious
policies is equally evident outside the legal establishment. Indeed,
concern with overall educational quality moved ahead of race on
most policy agendas after an unremitting series of reports
beginning in the 1980s warned of a “rising tide of mediocrity” in
American public education.112 Of particular note has been the
increasing dominance of the standards-based approach to
education reform at the state and federal levels113 and the
proliferation of “whole-school reform” models that provide an
off-the-rack reform template to individual schools.114 The result is
that the past two decades have witnessed an extraordinary amount
of education reform activity within state legislatures, universities,
private foundations, and big-city school districts, but
comparatively less policy activity that aims to foster racial

111

See, e.g., Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1981). For
an overview of the law of “high stakes testing,” see Paul T. O’Neill, Special
Education and High Stakes Testing for High School Graduation: An Analysis
of Current Law and Policy, 30 J.L. EDUC. 185 (2001).
112
See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT
RISK: THE IMPERATIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 5 (1983). Other
commission and foundation reports decrying the state of American public
education include NAT’L GOVERNOR’S ASS’N, TIME FOR RESULTS: THE
GOVERNORS’ 1991 REPORT ON EDUC. (1991); TASK FORCE ON EDUC. FOR
ECON. GROWTH, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES, ACTION FOR EXCELLENCE:
A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO IMPROVE OUR NATION’S SCHOOLS; and ERNEST
BOYER, HIGH SCHOOL: A REPORT ON SECONDARY EDUC. IN AM., THE
CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING (1983).
113
The standards movement aims to link student performance on
standardized tests to well-enforced rewards and sanctions as a means of
creating incentives for school reform and signaling locations within the system
where additional resources need to be devoted. See Helen F. Ladd,
Introduction, in HOLDING SCHOOLS ACCOUNTABLE: PERFORMANCE-BASED
REFORMS IN EDUCATION 5 (Helen F. Ladd ed., 1996).
114
See Engstrom, supra note 75.
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integration or that specifically funnels resources to minority
students.115
B. Federalism-Based Resource Disparities
A second aspect of the larger picture painted by the various
contributions to Law & School Reform is the extent to which lawdriven reform efforts in one area of educational policy interact
with reform efforts in other areas and sometimes produce
unintended consequences. The bird’s eye view provided by the
contributors to Law & School Reform brings this fact into relief.
For example, an important legacy of law-driven reform efforts is
that legal mobilization on behalf of disabled students and, to a
lesser extent, limited English proficient students, has produced a
federal statutory rights scheme that exacerbates resource
disparities for poor and minority students.
On this point, the most valuable contribution to Law & School
Reform comes from Molly McUsic, who convincingly argues that
the current system allocates resources in ways that shortchange
students in poor school districts.116 McUsic summarizes the
“three central features” of resource inequalities in the American
system as follows:
The legal system that delivers this order of educational
inequality is a unique combination of unfunded federal
mandates affecting local districts unequally, state legal
structures that deliver and fund education on a
geographical basis (segregating children largely by race
115

Hess reports that an estimated 3,000 school-reform measures were
implemented in the 1980s. By 1984, 275 state-level task forces were focusing
on education. See FREDERICK M. HESS, SPINNING WHEELS: THE POLITICS OF
URBAN SCHOOL REFORM 9 (1999). The sheer number of edited volumes
devoted to the topic further evidences the high volume of urban school policy
discussion. See, e.g., CHANGING URBAN EDUCATION (Clarence Stone ed.,
1998); NEW SCHOOLS FOR A NEW CENTURY: THE REDESIGN OF URBAN
EDUCATION (Diane Ravitch & Joseph Viteritti eds., 1997); STRATEGIES FOR
SCHOOL EQUITY: CREATING PRODUCTIVE SCHOOLS IN A JUST SOCIETY
(Marilyn Gittell ed., 1998).
116
McUsic, supra note 35, at 92-93.
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and class), and a subsidized system of private schools that
serves fewer than 10 percent of schoolchildren.117
While most lawyers and educators are familiar with the
advantages conferred by private schooling and the resource
disparities that arise from local fiscal control, substantially fewer
are probably aware of the allocational impact of unfunded federal
mandates relating to special and bilingual education.118
The allocational impact of federal mandates such as IDEA
stems from the failure of the federal government to fund the cost
of such mandates at anything above token levels.119 Reliable
estimates of total special education spending by local school
districts as mandated by IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act exceed $58 billion, more than $33 billion above the cost of
providing nonspecial education to those students.120 Thus,
disabled students receive a little less than one-fifth of total
resources in the system, even though disabled students represent
less than one-tenth of the total student population.121 But
Congress has never provided more than 13% of special education
funding (in 1980), and throughout the 1990s paid between 7%
and 8%.122 The result is that, of the $33 billion in marginal
expenditures for special education students, Congress foots the
117

Id. at 89.
For a general discussion of unfunded mandates, see Julie A. Roin,
Reconceptualizing Unfunded Mandates and Other Regulations, 93 N.W. L.
REV. 351 (1999).
119
The foregoing discussion is taken largely from McUsic, supra note 35,
at 95-97.
120
See Jay G. Chambers et al., What Are We Spending on Special
Education in the U.S.?, Center for Special Education Finance (Feb. 1998),
available at http://csef.air.org/papers/brief8.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2002).
121
Total education expenditures at the federal, state, and local level in
1998 were $328 billion. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2000, supra note 2, at
172 tbl. 275. The total number of students ages six to twenty-one served under
IDEA in 1996-97 was 5,235,952. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, TO
ASSURE THE FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION OF ALL CHILDREN WITH
DISABILITIES, supra note 4, at ii-16. The total student enrollment in the United
States in 1997 was nearly fifty-two million. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 2000,
supra note 2, at 151 tbl. 239.
122
McUsic, supra note 35, at 95.
118
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bill for approximately $2 billion. The remaining $31 billion falls
to states and local school districts. Similarly, in the last year that
the Department of Education issued a report to Congress, more
than 2.3 million limited English proficient students received
services under the Bilingual Education Act; the federal
government paid for the cost of educating only about 251,000, or
less than 11%, of them.123
The perverse effect of token federal funding of federal
mandates is fewer resources for poor, minority, and non-special
education students. The reason is that enforceable federal rights
under IDEA and the Bilingual Education Act require school
districts to allocate resources first to special education and
bilingual students, with the remainder going toward the education
of nonspecial education students.124 In addition, special education
and limited-English proficient students tend to be concentrated in
relatively poorer school districts.125 The result is that poorer
districts must allocate a disproportionate share of total resources
to compliance efforts under federal mandates.126 As McUsic
explains, the “predictable result” of this arrangement is that “a
greater share of elementary and secondary school spending over
the past twenty years has been allocated to special needs leaving
a shrinking share available for nonspecial education.”127 And in
poor school districts in particular, unfunded federal mandates
leave substantially fewer resources for below-average students—
particularly what Mark Kelman and Gillian Lester call “garden
variety bad readers”128—who might make equally compelling
claims to scarce educational resources.

123

OFFICE OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION AND MINORITY LANGUAGE
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE CONDITION OF BILINGUAL
EDUCATION: A REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 20 (1992).
124
McUsic, supra note 35, at 97.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 84, at 24, 147-48.
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C. Competing Reform Impulses and the Peculiar Legacy of
Brown

A final theme one might glean from the assembled
contributions to Law & School Reform is that law-driven school
reform efforts of the past five decades display a deep tension
between two very different reformist impulses. One is a
bureaucratic impulse that uses highly targeted resource infusions
as a means of maximizing the educational outcomes—and thus the
life chances—of specific student groups. This impulse extends to
efforts to advance educational equity by raising achievement
levels of African-Americans, the poor, the disabled, the limited
English proficient, or any other group perceived to be in a
position to benefit from additional resources.
Another equally powerful impulse is a legal and cultural
impulse extending from Brown v. Board of Education129 and the
broader civil rights movements of the post-war period. The
Brown impulse is a broader inclusionary vision and, while also
aimed at increasing the life chances of disfavored and
disadvantaged groups, is also deeply concerned with a broader
republican vision of equality that sees the participation of
excluded groups in mainstream democratic discourse and social
and economic life as ultimately redounding to the benefit of all.130
Reform efforts aimed at desegregation and the education of
disabled and LEP students are founded at least in part on this
broader inclusionary vision.
As a policy analysis matter, the two reformist impulses seem
to pose a basic incommensurability problem.131 How can
reformers weigh the relative value of educational achievement
129

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for
Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131 (1995) (exploring the possibility of a
constitutional right to education through analysis of the requirements of
“republican citizenship”).
131
See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92
MICH. L. REV. 779, 796 (1994) (“Incommensurability occurs when the
relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence
to our considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized.”).
130
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against the values of democratic solidarity, tolerance, or
appreciation of human difference that comes with the integration
of students of color and students with disabilities into mainstream
classrooms?132 No unitary metric accounts for how policymakers
actually think about the two kinds of benefits. As a result,
judging the desirability of different law-driven reform avenues
requires reformers to weigh costs and benefits at two very
different levels of abstraction.
Of course, critics may argue in response that this
incommensurability
problem
is
not
insurmountable.
Incommensurability need not entail incomparability as a matter of
policy analysis. Legislators and other policymakers, for example,
frequently weigh costs and benefits between policy outputs to
which most economists would attach the incommensurability
label. Similarly, critics may point out that the alleged tension
between bureaucratic and inclusionary reform impulses is little
more than a disagreement about the proper institutional mission
of public schools. For instance, some commentators have long
argued that schools are too often used as instruments for realizing
a broader social vision and that this takes schools away from a
more appropriate and more focused pedagogical mission.133 As an
example, the “back to basics” movement that swept education
policy circles in the 1980s and 1990s was, at least in part, an
effort to refocus the mission of public schools.134 But others—
going all the way back to John Dewey—see moral and political

132

Scholars are equally concerned with various “soft” variables,
including the extent of stigma that attaches to separate instruction. See
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION
AND AMERICAN LAW 35-39, 81-86 (1992) (arguing that “least restrictive
environment” determinations in the special education context pose a difficult
“choice between specialized services and some degree of separate treatment on
the one side, and minimized labeling and minimized segregation, on the
other”).
133
See DIANE RAVITCH, LEFT BACK: A CENTURY OF FAILED SCHOOL
REFORMS 15-16 (2000) (arguing that progressive education theorists attempted
to make schools more “socially useful,” but instead merely diluted and
minimized the core academic curriculum).
134
Id.
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instruction as central to the educational mission of public
schools.135
Law & School Reform, however, places competing reform
approaches side-by-side and helps make the case that the tension
is real and has had important distributive implications. Indeed,
what the contributions to Law & School Reform together suggest,
and what is particularly ironic in the education context, is that
judicial foreclosure of race-based resource claims has meant that
the powerful vision of social inclusion articulated in Brown
currently bolsters resource claims made by disabled students, but
not resource claims made by poor or African-American students,
the latter of whom were its original intended beneficiaries. One
peculiar and ironic legacy of Brown, then, is fewer educational
resources for African-Americans.
IV. THE ROLE OF LAWYERS
A. Are Lawyers to Blame?
To what extent are lawyers culpable in any of the above? To
be sure, identifying trends is not the same as assigning blame.
One might argue that the role played by lawyers in past school
reform efforts is perfectly understandable. For instance, it is well
known that the systemic distributional consequences of individual
litigation efforts are a traditional blind spot for the judicial system
as a whole.136 In addition, lawyers advocate on behalf of
particular groups of clients in pursuit of particular outcomes.
And, in so doing, lawyers remain bound by professional-ethical
obligations that demand zealous pursuit of client interests.
Lawyers as a whole also tend to view the social world through
the lens of the creation and vindication of rights. Given that the
dominant legal understanding sees rights as trumps that immunize

135

See generally JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION (1997).
See HOROWITZ, supra note 46, at 32-62 (describing the problems of
information, vision, and piecemeal adjudication that are unique to the judicial
process).
136
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individual rights-bearers from majoritarian decision-making,137 it
is perhaps unfair to argue that lawyers should be better attuned to
the global budgeting process that drives most social policymaking
in non-legal, non-rights-oriented contexts.
Also, the traditional blindness of lawyers to the distributional
consequences of law-driven school reform efforts may not be
grounds for critique at all, but rather should be seen as laudable
and entirely consistent with the institutional role of lawyers. We
might even believe that the lawyers-as-hired-guns model
maximizes institutional performance of the judicial system,
whether as a truth-seeking device or as a forum for resolving
competing resource claims.138 And to the extent that lawyers
engaged in law-driven school reform efforts are self-consciously
practicing so-called “cause lawyering,” it would be difficult to
critique education lawyers for attempting to connect morality to
law, particularly if such efforts ultimately legitimate the
profession and the legal system as a whole.139 In short, to lay
blame at the feet of education lawyers requires a deeper—and
likely unsuccessful—critique of the lawyerly craft and
institutional role.
B. The Future of Law-Driven School Reform
The more important question is, how might law-driven
reform efforts advance educational equity in the future? At the
end of the day, Law & School Reform provides very little
concrete guidance to education lawyers going forward. The
prescriptions are simply too narrow. Reading Law & School
137

See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1977).
For further discussion of various rights conceptions, see Richard H. Pildes,
Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEG. STUD. 725 (1998).
138
See, e.g., STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A
DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 44-51(1984).
139
See Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the
Reproduction of Professional Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
3 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
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Reform, one cannot help but think that law-driven reform efforts
will never again impact educational equity to the same extent that
earlier, Brown-inspired challenges did.140 Instead, future reform
efforts will likely center on the much more mundane task of
optimizing resource allocations within the system as a whole.
And without denigrating what remains an important task, what is
most depressing from a lawyerly perspective is that it is not clear
why lawyers and litigation enjoy any comparative advantage in
any of the tasks that lie ahead.
That said, Law & School Reform is a valuable contribution to
the literature because it is the first volume of its kind to juxtapose
the various approaches through which lawyers, law, and legal
institutions have engaged the educational system in an effort to
advance educational equity. The book thus represents a coherent
attempt to do what legal scholars and policy advocates have only
recently started to do—to think hard about how different legal
movements fit together and judge the relative efficacy of
available law-driven reform approaches.141 Here is where Law &
School Reform promises to spur interesting debate. And here is
where Heubert’s take on the issues is not so vulnerable to critique
as it is to the thought that he might have productively taken his
call for policy learning even further.
Policy learning may be precisely what is needed because
much of the explanation for trends in the allocation of educational
resources is political. Legal scholarship has only just begun to
critique the political presuppositions and theories of anti-

140

Of course, recent scholarship also argues that Brown may have been
less effective than most lawyers had thought, see ROSENBERG, supra note 8, at
49-54 (summarizing data on the relationship of the Court’s Brown decision and
actual desegregation of public schools), or even counterproductive, see
Michael Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80
VA. L. REV. 7, 10-11 & n.10 (1994) (arguing that racial change would have
come regardless of Brown, and that the Court’s decision may have actually
forestalled federal legislative change by crystallizing southern white
resistance).
141
See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J.
249, 254, 256 (1999) (assessing the relative efficacy of desegregation and
school finance reform and arguing for more of the former).
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discrimination that underpin redistributive claims in the education
policy context.142 Some have argued that the disabled are a
readily identifiable and socially salient subset of the student
population, and that their claims for resource infusions are
strengthened because of the ease with which disabled students can
be constructed as a plausible deserving group.143 In addition, and
as Heubert observes, “Minority children, poor children, and
immigrant children do not enjoy as much political or legal
support as do children whose defining characteristic—disability—
cuts across all economic classes and racial groups.”144 The
disabled clearly enjoy an enormous amount of political power, at
least relative to other more diffuse and less well-organized
groups.145 In addition, the IDEA was pushed through Congress
with surprisingly little opposition, buffeted in part by middle
class parents in search of additional resources and a less
stigmatizing label for their under-achieving children.146 Finally, it
is worth noting that legislative efforts on behalf of the learning
disabled took place in a post-1960s Washington policymaking
environment that is seen by many political scientists as
increasingly receptive to narrow interest group claims.147
142

The most thoughtful contribution by far is KELMAN & LESTER, supra
note 84. However, Kelman and Lester focus exclusively on special education
and, in particular, those students labeled “learning disabled” (“LD”), and do
not compare special education and race-based claims. For a broader treatment
of the “difference dilemma” at the heart of redistributive politics, see MINOW,
supra note 132.
143
On this point, see KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 84, at 197. The
authors claim that this construction matters most of all because it takes
advantage of a basic distinction that underpins nearly all American welfare
state politics—between the deserving and undeserving poor. See also MICHAEL
B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE
WAR ON WELFARE 10 (1989); Michele L. Landis, Fate, Responsibility, and
“Natural” Disaster Relief: Narrating the American Welfare State, 33 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 257, 257 (1999).
144
Heubert, supra note 19, at 16.
145
See JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973).
146
See KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 84.
147
The IDEA emerged during the post-1960s dispersal of power in the
Washington policymaking environment that some political scientists have
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Programs that serve minority and poor students, by contrast,
suffer from a form of “entitlement creep,” a familiar
phenomenon whereby government programs—particularly meanstested benefits—gradually creep up the socio-economic ladder
and are distributed to claimants eager to take advantage of
government largesse.148 Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act was initially conceived as a means of topping up
education spending and funneling additional federal resources to
poor and, in particular, heavily African-American districts.149
The program has evolved, however, in very different directions.
As McUsic points out,
[T]he same political forces that shape and preserve the
current legal regime also shaped Title I, turning it, in
effect, into a pork barrel program with funds for every
congressional district, and thereby turning federal funds
argued increased the receptivity of the political system to narrow interest
group claims. The most notable changes, which likely drove the others, were
internal reforms in Congress to a freewheeling and decentralized committee
system that increased interest group access. See Paul J. Quirk, Policy Making
in the Contemporary Congress: Three Dimensions of Performance, in THE
NEW POLITICS OF PUBLIC POLICY 228, 229 (Mark K. Landy & Martin A.
Levin eds., 1995). In particular, a process once dominated by policy
“subgovernments”—characterized by close relations between an oligarchically
organized Congress and powerful private interests—now takes place within
more inclusive and diffuse “issue networks” inhabited by a more complex
array of stake-holders and stake-challengers. See Hugh Heclo, Issue Networks
and the Executive Establishment, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
87, 88 (Anthony King ed., 1978). In addition, the development of
sophisticated media technologies and changes in the electoral system—
including the post-1972 embrace of direct primaries and campaign finance
reforms—have produced “candidate-centered” campaigns while simultaneously
weakening party affiliations. See Martin P. Wattenberg, From a Partisan to a
Candidate-Centered Electorate, in THE NEW AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM
139, 140 (Anthony King ed., 1990).
148
See ROBERT E. GOODIN & JULIAN LE GRAND, NOT ONLY THE POOR:
THE MIDDLE CLASSES AND THE WELFARE STATE 3 (1987) (arguing that the
non-poor play a major role in “creating, expanding, sustaining, reforming,
and dismantling the welfare state” and that their involvement is at least in part
driven by their desire to capture programs for their direct benefit).
149
See 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (1994); McUsic, supra note 35, at 94.
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intended to be more or less equalizing across states and
districts into payments that were more or less equal across
states and districts.150
As of 1993, McUsic continues, approximately 90% of the
nation’s school districts and 71% of all public elementary schools
received Title I funding.151
At a time when the educational system is wrestling with
fundamental questions of “who gets what, when, how,” it seems
that the most productive activities in which lawyers can engage
are proactive, challenging dialogue about future policy options
and pressing for a fair allocation of resources within the political
process that may or may not be skewing redistributions in
unintended ways. As an example, lawyers are already playing an
important role in rapidly proliferating litigation challenging the
establishment and placement of charter schools.152 Thus, lawyers
can make a critical contribution by ensuring that reform
approaches do not disproportionately aid the better-off at the
expense of the worse-off. In addition, the organization and
delivery of public education is clearly in for substantial change in
the coming years. Non-legal scholars have begun to stake out a
position that calls for a re-alignment of the entire system of
school finance at all three levels of government.153 And on
January 8, 2002, President Bush signed into law the “No Child
Left Behind Act,” described by some as the most sweeping
federal school measure since passage of the Elementary and

150

McUsic, supra note 35, at 94.
Id. at 94.
152
See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding
of Status-Consciousness: The Case of Deregulated Education, 50 DUKE L.J.
753, 758 n.15 (documenting litigation challenging charter schools that are
“status identifiable” and thus aim to prevent actual and prospective charter
schools from disproportionately aiding elites or practicing various forms of
discrimination).
153
See, e.g., KENNETH K. WONG, FUNDING PUBLIC SCHOOLS: POLITICS
AND POLICIES 1-2 (1999) (arguing that the key to maximizing the performance
of the educational system as a whole is the creation of decision rules that
better align and allocate resources among levels of government).
151
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Secondary Education Act in 1965.154 Changes to the system will
undoubtedly provide opportunities and challenges for reformminded lawyers.
CONCLUSION
In the end, Law & School Reform is an outstanding and
much-needed contribution to the field of law and education
scholarship. It is notable that the book bills itself as being “not
solely for legal experts or scholars but for a general audience of
educators, advocates, policy makers, parents, and scholars
interested in school reform.”155 For general audiences, the book
elegantly covers a tremendous amount of territory.
Unfortunately, for lawyers seeking to use their lawyerly skills to
increase educational equity, the book probably falls short as a
how-to guide. Even so, this may be the ultimate strength of Law
& School Reform, particularly given what lies ahead. Indeed,
what emerges from the juxtaposition of different reform
approaches in Law & School Reform is a sense that lawyers can
contribute greatly to the advancement of educational equity not
by becoming more informed about the nuts and bolts of specific
education practice areas or by initiating additional litigation, but
rather by becoming better and more persuasive policy wonks. By
continuing to think about how legal strategies interact, what kinds
of educational equity are worth pursuing, and which groups are
likely to emerge as winners and losers in the political process,
lawyers can continue to broaden and deepen educational equity in
ways that balance the competing impulses within prior law-driven
154

See Helen Dewar, Landmark Education Legislation Gets Final
Approval in Congress, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at A8. Among other
things, the bill mandates standardized testing for all students from grades three
through eight, imposes sanctions against schools that do not demonstrate
steady improvement over a twelve year period, provides failing schools with
additional money for tutoring and other services, increases the federal share of
special education costs, and sets into motion a limited form of school choice,
whereby students in perpetually failing schools will be free to attend
neighboring schools if their own schools fail to meet performance goals. Id.
155
Heubert, supra note 19, at 8.
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reform efforts. By making available in a single volume nearly
fifty years of law-driven school reform efforts, Law & School
Reform almost certainly helps to move education lawyers down
that path.

